Give us the Bomb or we won't stop Killing your Soldiers

Excerpts from Kenneth Pollack's piece on the folly of negotiating with Iran from a weak position:

(...)

Today, large numbers of Iranian intelligence agents have infiltrated Iraq, where they seem to be providing money, weapons and other supplies to virtually all of Iraq's Shi’ite militias.


Most Iraqis dislike the Iranians. In fact, "dislike" is too mild a term. In 2004 and early 2005, when it still seemed as if the United States-led reconstruction of Iraq might succeed, Shiite politicians were bending over backward to demonstrate that they were independent of Iran for fear their constituents would not support them otherwise.

Furthermore, while Iranian support is no doubt gratefully received, the evidence suggests that it is now more a supplement than a necessity for the major militias. At this point, the main Shiite groups — the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, and the Fadhila Party among others — have considerable support among the population and are accused of making enormous amounts of money off oil smuggling and organized crime.

So Tehran can influence the behavior of the Shiite groups, but it probably would have a hard time forcing them to do things they do not want to do — like disbanding their militias, accepting a national reconciliation agreement, participating in an equitable oil-sharing scheme or accepting any of the other major changes that the Bush administration is seeking. If Iran were to threaten to end its support for these groups, they would most likely tell Tehran to get lost. What's more, the Iranians seem to understand this, having so far proven reluctant to try to force any of the Shiite groups to radically change course.

The limits on Iranian influence are a double-edged sword. They mean that we cannot count on Iran to solve Iraq's problems, but they also mean that we need not offer the Iranians the world in return for their assistance. Right now, Tehran and its bombastic president are riding high in the Middle East, and they will doubtless want something in return for helping America deal with Iraq. For instance, they may demand that the United States drop its objections to their nuclear program or cave in to Hezbollah's demands for a greater say in Lebanon.

We can't simply expect Iran to save Iraq for us. We Americans need a new, feasible plan of our own. Only then will we know how best Iran can help, and what we are willing to pay for that help. Talking to Iran without such a plan would be fruitless, if not folly.