Ahmadinejad (on Supreme Leader's order) Wants Contorl of the Economy

photo: Ayatollah Khamenie in the middle in his army fatigue before he became the supreme leader. He is on his way to torture or issue order of killings dissidents in 1979

There is no "justice" in the World without Islam"--Suupreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamanie

The president wants control of the economy to improve Islamic Republic's "global responsibility. The goal includes the spread of what Ahmadinejad described as justice and "kindness" around the world, and changing "the structure of international relations in the interests of nations" ("Hamshahri" reported on August 13). You might think that the bearded boy's "agenda for the world" is something new; you'd be wrong. just read this article, which was published in 2005.


Here is more on the removal of Iran's oil and industry ministers from the Economist:

"The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has engineered the removal of Iran's oil and industry ministers in a move widely interpreted as signalling his push to impose his will and control over core areas of the economy in the lead-up to the parliamentary election scheduled for March 2008.
The oil minister, Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, and his industry colleague, Alireza Tahmasebi, were both reported to have tendered their resignation, but it has been widely assumed that Mr Ahmadinejad ordered their removal. That Mr Vaziri-Hamaneh was the president's fourth choice as oil minister (after Mr Ahmadinejad's initial nominations were blocked by parliament soon after his election in 2005), and Mr Tahmasebi was increasingly identified as opposing the president's industry reform plans, certainly made their departures that much more likely. However, the impromptu dismissal of these two senior ministers is still surprising and focuses attention once more on the internal political power-play currently underway within the government and the ruling conservative elite.here is the rest of it.

Do it my way
The replacement of the oil minister of one of OPEC's leading member states—Iran is the second-largest producer in the group, after Saudi Arabia—would normally be expected to cause ripples in the world oil market. However, the reaction of the oil market has been muted, reflecting the dominant view that these moves have more to do with domestic politics than with oil policy. Mr Ahmadinejad seems to be hoping that with parliament distracted with the impending elections, he will be able to force through his new nomination without too much hindrance. Gaining control over the oil ministry is deemed critical for a president who was elected on a pledge to bring oil revenues to each and every Iranian household. Having failed to live up to such promises after almost two years in power, and with sentiment turning against an administration that recently imposed fuel rationing on an unsuspecting population, Mr Ahmadinejad has made his oil minister a convenient scapegoat. Some Iranian newspapers have suggested that Mr Vaziri-Hamaneh had been seeking clearance to sell gasoline at market prices to drivers that have used up their subsidised rations, but that the president had refused on the grounds that this would stoke up inflation. (Earlier this year he decreed that interest rates should be cut in order to bring down inflation, overruling the central bank, which was inclined to the more orthodox approach of raising rates.)

Mr Vaziri-Hamaneh has also faced harsh criticism for supposedly having agreed to sell gas to Pakistan and India too cheaply. Even though a final agreement in this so-called "peace pipeline" is still a long way off, the controversy that has been whipped up over the pricing undoubtedly helped to hasten the minister's departure.

The president has named Gholam-Hossein Nozari, the head of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), as interim oil minister, and Ali Akbar Mehrabian, the president's representative on the parliamentary fuel consumption committee, as the stand-in industry minister. Mr Nozari was put in charge of NIOC in 2006 in a shake-up of positions within the oil industry. He is thought to favour offering more attractive terms for foreign companies to invest in Iran's upstream oil and gas sector, but it is unlikely that he will be allowed to show much initiative, given the clear signs that Mr Ahmadinejad is intent on maximising his control over economic policy.

The replacement of the two ministers follows moves by Mr Ahmadinejad to order root-and-branch changes in several state institutions. The most significant was the decision in July to reorganise the Management and Planning Organisation (MPO), which has been the backbone of economic planning and budget drafting for the past six decades, by integrating it into the Office of the President. The president argued that the move would streamline the bureaucracy and speed up decision-making, but it shocked many officials and economists already critical of government economic policy, who argued that it would weaken co-ordination between different government departments and organisations. Farhad Rahbar, the head of the MPO, resigned in protest at the move, and suggested that although he agreed with the concept of restructuring, the haste of the change would undermine planning expertise.

Vote FILF
The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections—Mr Ahmadinejad'sterm ends in mid-2009—provide the political context to these battles within the Iranian administration. The general election is likely to be a closely-fought contest between the dominant conservative camp and a relatively resurgent reformist opposition. Internal dissent within the conservative camp has propelled senior figures to call for the formation of a unified list. These calls acquired a greater sense of urgency following a gathering of the general assembly of the Followers of the Imam and the Leadership Front (FILF), a major conservative faction, in June. The FILF had already established a six-member team aimed at forging unity among the various conservative groups. In December's local elections the conservative vote was split broadly between lists associated with Mr Ahmadinejad and those set up by his critics. The relative success of the reformist camp and of supporters of the former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in both the local and the Khobregan (Assembly of Experts) elections, which were held concurrently, have convinced conservatives of the need for greater co-ordination. Not satisfied by the appeal and performance of his fellow conservatives, Mr Ahmadinejad has reverted to the old maxim whereby "the leader knows best". In seeking to regain control over the government and in bolstering its true conservative credentials (a move aimed at maximising Mr Ahmadinejad's support amongst his core constituency), further cabinet reshuffles cannot be ruled out as the president moves to impose order on his often recalcitrant ministers. The foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, and the central bank governor, Ebrahim Sheibani, are thought to be most vulnerable to the president's whims.