How Supreme is Iran's Supreme Turban?

Supremely Paranoid;
Photo from Economist

There is something quite important afoot, that bears paying attention to. Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji have co-authored an interesting piece in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which provides a rare insight into the internal power struggle between the two main factions of Islamic Republic's axis of power, the supremely paranoid Khamanei's faction (see "Men of Principle") and the capitalist/technocrat mullah Rafsanjani. It also looks like the democracy-hating *Heideggerian Crocodile (Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi), spiritual leader of Ahmadinejad, counting the days to replace opium-smoking Supreme leader. Interesting note on the co-author of this article, Mehid Khalaji: Mehdi Khalaji has been a frequent contributor to the Assembly of Experts journal Hukumat-e Islami. In addition, assembly speaker Meshkini is a longtime friend of the Khalaji family. Long article but worthwhile. Here are some highlights:
Rafsanjani excels at turning obscure posts into power centers. As Majlis speaker in the 1980s, he became a central powerbroker between the feuding president (Khamenei) and prime minister (a post since abolished). Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently created the Expediency Council to resolve differences between the many power centers in Iran's complicated government structure, later enshrined in the constitution. Although the council was initially weak, it acquired a large, active staff and a new headquarters next to the Supreme Leader's offices once Rafsanjani stepped down as president in 1997 and was appointed council chair. Intriguingly, the council has the main say in what happens while the Supreme Leader's post is vacant, at least until the Assembly of Experts elects a new leader.

Rafsanjani took full advantage of his success in the December 2006 assembly election to assert himself on the national stage. In early 2007 -- a period when Ahmadinezhad was being criticized in the conservative press for endangering Iran's national unity and security by acting too combatively, and when reports were circulating of Khamenei's ill health (e.g., Fars News Agency stated that he was hospitalized briefly) -- Rafsanjani began acting as if he were the real powerbroker. In February, he made a widely publicized round of visits to top ayatollahs in Qom. Rumors flew that, in addition to seeking their general support, he was sounding them out about reducing Khamenei's power. Then, at the first meeting of the new assembly, he stated, "The Fourth Assembly of Experts could exercise its supervisory powers more than before."

Khamenei came roaring back, however, with several fire-breathing major addresses around the Nowruz spring equinox holidays. The Supreme Leader reaffirmed the hardline stance on the nuclear program and asserted that any talks with the West had to be conducted under his strict control.

What to Expect Next, and Implications for the West

If permitted to remain at the head of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani would pose a persistent and open challenge to Khamenei. Accordingly, the assembly will likely meet soon to place a politically inactive senior cleric atop the assembly, such as Mohammad Imam-e Kashani, the Tehran Friday prayer leader. Even in that case, however, Rafsanjani's twin posts at the assembly and the Expediency Council give him a power base from which he can maneuver to limit or replace Khamenei.

In the event that Khamenei dies, the new Supreme Leader would most likely be a compromise candidate rather than either of the two polarizing figures said to want the post: Rafsanjani, a technocrat, and Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, an extreme hardliner openly dismissive of democracy. The senior clerics, the Majlis, the technocracy, and the revolutionary power structure (i.e., the IRGC, Basij, and the foundations that control the economy) all share a common interest in a weak leader with limited ability to check them.

For the West, there are many advantages if Iran's leadership is weakened by internal disputes. Such an Iran would be busier domestically and therefore less able to concentrate on foreign adventures. It would also be more aware of its weaknesses and therefore more likely to compromise. To be sure, a weak Supreme Leader would presumably have less authority to impose difficult compromises on objecting factions. That, however, seems like a price worth paying in order to see a less powerful revolutionary leadership.

*Heidegger and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi